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How New York Drinks
IF AND HOW THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS CAN
INTEGRATE WITH THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
The leaders of the American temperance movement are
surely turning in their graves. Today, a New York consumer need
not directly interact with a brick-and-mortar establishment to
purchase alcohol. A slew of new companies with names like Drizly,
Minibar, Swill, and Thirstie, as well as giants like Amazon, enable
convenience or novelty-seeking city dwellers to order drinks for
delivery through their websites and apps.1 These companies
have come to be known as third-party providers (TPPs) because
they do not themselves hold a state license to sell alcohol, but
work with retailers that do,2 in order to bring customers the
convenience of ordering a bottle of Bordeaux from bed. TPPs
purport to make the alcohol buying experience easier by
providing a platform for license-holding retailers to list their
inventory online for purchase.3
Alcohol sales in the United States reached over $220
billion in 2016, and the alcohol industry directly employs more
than 4.5 million people,4 but strangely, the laws governing this
burgeoning industry are still largely influenced by Prohibition-

1 See About, TEAM MINIBAR, https://minibardelivery.com/about [https://perma.cc/
Q8VY-TXAE]; About, THIRSTIE, https://thirstie.com/about [https://perma.cc/VDX8-TXFB];
About Us, DRIZLY, https://drizly.com/about-us/e-594c4a6ff3342911 [https://perma.cc/46EFZR5T]; Christian de Looper, Amazon Brings One-Hour Alcohol Delivery to Prime Customers
in New York, TECH TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015, 7:23 PM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/
115286/20151210/amazon-brings-one-hour-alcohol-delivery-prime-customers-new-york.htm
[https://perma.cc/W7FZ-672Z]; What is SWILL?, SWILL, https://swill.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/
articles/213015507-What-is-SWILL- [https://perma.cc/3SUD-DYS7].
2 See Alana Lenore Joyce, Note, Wine Online: Fermenting the Role of Third
Party Providers from California to New York, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2035, 2037 (2015).
3 See id.
4 Economic Contributions of the Distilled Spirits Industry, DISCUS, http://
www.discus.org/economics/ [https://perma.cc/MQW5-6TVG]; Total alcoholic beverage sales in
the United States from 2006 to 2016, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/207936/ustotal-alcoholic-beverages-sales-since-1990/ [https://perma.cc/XS4E-LDK7].
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era principles.5 Even after the repeal of Prohibition, many
American constituencies believed that alcohol caused degeneracy
and was contrary to progressive American ideals.6 Repeal-era
lawmakers therefore sought to make alcohol hard to obtain, while
simultaneously trying to fill the state coffers.7 They accomplished
this by implementing either a state monopoly over alcohol
distribution or a “system of licensing and taxation.”8
In states that adopted a three-tier licensing and taxation
system, participants at each tier generally may be involved in
only one major stage of bringing an alcoholic beverage to
market.9 There are, however, many nuances and exceptions that
vary from state to state.10 At the production tier, a licensee
makes the liquid, bottles it, and sells it to a licensed wholesaler.11
The licensee at the wholesale tier may only purchase the product
from the producer and sell it to retailers, but not to the general
public.12 Finally, a licensee at the retail tier who has no
involvement in either of the first two tiers is the only party that
may sell to the general public.13 Retailers can be “restaurants . . . ,
bars, and retail stores that sell beer, wine and liquor.”14 In theory,
the system rejects vertical integration,15 although in practice state
systems can derogate from this general principle since, after all,
alcohol regulation is a state prerogative.
“[T]he temperance ideal and the culture that produced it
have all but vanished”16 from modern politics, but not from the
law. Those sensibilities live on in the Alcohol Beverage Control
(ABC) Laws, as many states have adopted versions of the three5 See DEBORAH M. GRAY, EXPORTER’S HANDBOOK TO THE U.S. WINE MARKET
10 (2015); LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN STATE 247 (2016).
6 See MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 20, 249. The dry era came to an end largely
due to the economic concerns ushered in by the Great Depression, as well as popular
support for action against organized crime, which may not have risen to such infamy and
influence without a black market for moonshine and illicit liquor. Id. at 244, 249.
7 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 10.
8 William E. Spellman & Mark R. Jorgenson, The Social and Revenue Effects
of State Alcoholic Beverage Control, 41 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 77, 77 (1982).
9 N AT ’ L A LCOHOL B EVERAGE C ONTROL A SS ’ N , T IED -H OUSE L AWS : P OLICY ,
EXEMPTIONS, AND L EGAL CHALLENGES: A P RESENTATION TO THE 24TH ANNUAL
SYMPOSIUM ON ALCOHOL BEVERAGE L AW AND REGULATION 4 (2017), www.nabca.org
/Resources/MaterialsDownload.aspx?eid=7932; see also Roni A. Elias, Three Cheers for
Three Tiers: Why the Three-Tier System Maintains Its Legal Validity and Social Benefits
After Granholm, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 209, 211–12, 216–17 (2015).
10 RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 34 (1933).
11 Elias, supra note 9, at 212.
12 See id at 216–17.
13 See id. at 213, 216–17.
14 Id. at 213.
15 NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 9, at 4.
16 W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRADITION
221 (1979).
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tier system and established state alcohol regulatory agencies.17
Thus, the regulatory structure of the temperance era remains in
place throughout the country.
Regardless of its efficacy, the three-tier system is likely
here to stay.18 Until the advent of the third-party-provider
model, there had been few push-backs on the system. The only
major challenge to the three-tier system has been whether it
violates the dormant commerce clause in the context of direct
shipping,19 and the Supreme Court resolved that issue in 2005. In
Granholm v. Heald, the Court held that state creation of an
exception to the three-tier system that advantages in-state
economic interests and burdens out-of-state interests—such as
allowing an in-state producer to bypass a wholesaler—constitutes
discrimination against interstate commerce in violation of the
dormant commerce clause.20 The Court further stated in dicta
that the three-tier system is “unquestionably legitimate,”21
thereby answering any lingering questions about the Court’s
opinion of the system itself. Therefore, this note proceeds on that
assumption and analyzes how TPPs fit into this unquestionably
legitimate system.
Although the architects of the three-tier system created
a durable framework, they could not have anticipated modern
technology and how it could substantially affect consumer
behavior related to the purchase and consumption of alcohol.22
TPPs unquestionably challenge the structure of the three-tier
system. The new function of TPPs is relatively simple, but
because it could only be possible for unlicensed entities like
TPPs to participate in the sale of alcohol by working with a
licensee, regulators must ask if TPPs are really availing
themselves of retailers’ licenses.23 TPPs purposely refrain from
identifying as “disruptor[s]”24 in order to avoid the inference that
See Elias, supra note 9, at 216.
This note does not aim to analyze the true efficacy of the three-tier system
itself, but rather to identify a workable solution within it.
19 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
20 Id. at 493.
21 Id. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)).
22 See E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, N.Y. ST. LIQUOR AUTH. 1:25–1:43
(Apr. 11, 2016), http://abc-state-ny.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id
=981 [https://perma.cc/S9T5-RMZR].
23 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
24 See, e.g., Nicholas Rellas, Why I Started An Alcohol Delivery Company In A
City With No Happy Hours, LINKEDIN (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/why-i-started-alcohol-delivery-company-city-happy-hours-rellas [https://perma.cc/
H3WU-ETWK]. The term “disruptor” is commonly understood to refer to a company that
alters the status quo of an industry in such a way that “successfully challenge[s]
established incumbent businesses.” Clayton M. Christensen et al., What is Disruptive
Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive17
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their businesses overstep the privileges of licensees, but they are
arguably engaging in activities that are an integral part of the
three-tier system.25 For this reason, a few states have attempted
to provide guidance regarding regulatory compliance to these types
of businesses. New York, for example, has done so through
declaratory judgments issued by the state regulatory body.26
Despite those efforts, competing interests—including states’
ambitions to become technology hubs, traditional brick-and-mortar
retailers’ interests in retaining the privileges of their licenses, and
entrepreneurs’ interests in capitalizing on innovation and trends
in consumer demand—have created a lack of consensus and
direction that, together, have blocked sincere regulatory effort.27
In its declaratory judgments, the New York State Liquor
Authority (NYSLA)28 has articulated its position as to the
appropriate role of third parties and their obligations to
licensees.29 The NYSLA, however, has repeatedly failed to apply
its own rules uniformly, thus creating a hazy regulatory
landscape where it is possible, and probable, that TPPs avail
themselves of retailer licenses by overstepping the boundaries of
the rights and duties of the licensee.30 In order to avoid
availment and unfair competition problems, it is incumbent
upon the NYSLA to take concrete action. The issuance of a thirdparty permit would most effectively address the concerns of state
regulators, licensed retailers, and TPPs themselves.
Part I illustrates the overarching legal framework that
governs liquor law, from the authority granted to states by the
Twenty-First Amendment and complementary law on the
federal level, to state implementation of that authority and bigpicture rationale supporting the three-tier system ultimately
implemented. Part II explains the local framework specific to
innovation [https://perma.cc/X6XW-GKLF]. Business theorists attribute more nuance to the
concept of disruption than is required for the purposes of the discussion in this note. See id.
25 Joyce, supra note 2, at 2037.
26 See discussion infra Section III.B.
27 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 12:44–13:01, 18:09–
21:18. (While brick and mortar liquor store owners accept that there is consumer demand
for services provided by TPPs, they believe that TPPs create unfair competition by being
permitted to engage in the sale of alcohol without the barriers to entry and
responsibilities incumbent upon licensees. TPPs, on the other hand, see themselves as
mere technology providers. Combined with the state interest in generating economic
activity, but also in responsible regulation, industry participants have not been able to
agree on a way forward.).
28 The New York State Liquor Authority is the agency responsible for
regulating the alcohol trade in the state of New York. Agency Mission Statement, N.Y.
ST. LIQUOR AUTH., https://www.sla.ny.gov/agency-mission-statement [https://perma.cc/
NB7C-YDNR].
29 See discussion infra Sections III.B, V.C.
30 See discussion infra Sections III.B, IV. A, IV.B.
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New York State, including the role of the NYSLA and statespecific treatment of the three tiers. Part III discusses treatment
of the third-party-provider problem, including the different ways in
which they can conduct business, how the NYSLA has adjudicated
different applications for approval through declaratory judgments,
and the resulting hazy regulatory landscape. Part IV addresses the
problems and consequences of third-party interaction with the
traditional model. Part V evaluates possible solutions, and
concludes that the creation of a third-party permit would provide
the most effective solution by addressing the concerns of each
interest group involved.
I. OVERARCHING LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ALCOHOL
INDUSTRY
After the failure of national prohibition, control over
alcohol regulation returned to the states. The most commonly
adopted framework was, and remains, what we now call the
three-tier system.
A. Prohibition, Repeal, and the Federal Interest
The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment represented
the culmination of an American religious and social movement
that had been mounting for decades against the perceived
“degeneracy” caused by alcohol.31 It prohibited the “manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States.”32 A national political tilt toward progressive
reform combined with a wartime sense of sacrifice and patriotism
eventually garnered broad congressional support for the
amendment, and led to swift state ratification.33 Policymakers
and proponents of Prohibition hoped that it would usher in a new
era of cultural improvement.34 While Prohibition helped
decrease consumption rates, “draconian new fines and penalties”
were imposed,35 usually upon poor people found violating the
law,36 and crime rates associated with bootlegging and mob
violence soared due to the market for illicit liquor.37 With the
arrival of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, and the need
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 14–21.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII § 1.
MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 35.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 71.
See id. at 53–54, 57.
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to prioritize economic stimuli, many Americans were ready to
repeal the Eighteenth Amendment as quickly as they had
enacted it.38
Prohibition made Americans both more skeptical and more
tolerant of federal regulatory power.39 Many of the alternative
regulatory schemes that emerged during the post-Prohibition
debate over liquor control reflected a soberer consciousness
regarding the “promises and perils of federal regulatory power.”40
Still, the most popular proposals granted the federal government
significant, if not absolute, authority to regulate the alcohol
industry.41 Shortly after taking office, Franklin D. Roosevelt
famously stated, “It’s time the country did something about beer.”42
The first section of the Twenty-First Amendment
repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and the second section
“forbids the transportation of intoxicants into any state for
delivery or use in violation of the laws of that state.”43 Congress
thereby returned to the states the power to regulate the alcohol
industry within its borders.44 The enthusiasm to remain dry in
some states eventually faded,45 but lingering support for the
moral principles behind Prohibition lived on in state regulation
both through state monopolies, and through the three-tier
system adopted by most states.46

Id. at 233.
Id. at 247.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 247. Two of the proposed alternative liquor control models were the
Gothenburg system and the Quebec plan. Id. The hallmark of the Gothenburg system was
the issuance of one retail license to a company that would be held as a trust. Gothenburg
Public Houses, SCOTTISH MINING WEBSITE, http://www.scottishmining.co.uk/18.html
[https://perma.cc/C78Q-E7TA]. The trust was responsible for administering use of the
license in a way that discouraged excessive drinking, and for administering 95 percent of
the profits for the benefit of the community. Id. The American version would likely have
allowed the federal government to retain influence over the industry through
administration of the trust. See id.; see also MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 247. A Quebec-style
plan implies a government monopoly. MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 247.
42 Id. at xiii.
43 FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 25 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
44 See id. at 17–18, 25. It is Section Two that has caused much debate with
respect to the conflict between the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant commerce
clause, particularly in the context of direct shipment of wine. See Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460, 460 (2005); Amy Murphy, Note, Discarding the North Dakota Dictum: An
Argument for Strict Scrutiny of the Three-Tier Distribution System, 110 MICH. L. REV.
819, 821 (2012).
45 See MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 249.
46 See Spellman & Jorgenson, supra note 8, at 77, Elias, supra note 9, at 216.
Washington State is unique in that voters by referendum recently elected to allow
producers to sell directly to retailers, as well as other provisions that increase freedom
of movement. Melissa Allison, Voters Kick State Out of Liquor Business, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, http://old.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016720231_elexliq
uor09m.html [https://perma.cc/XEZ2-878N].
38

39
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The modern regulatory landscape for alcohol sales in the
United States consists of an intricately woven thicket of federal
and state laws, and state programs must conform with some
degree of federal oversight.47 Until the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau (ATTB) was created in 2003 under the
umbrella of the Treasury Department, the federal government
regulated different parts of the alcohol business through a
patchwork of individuals representing numerous agencies.48 The
role of the ATTB is to collect federal taxes on alcohol and ensure
compliance with federal law regulating the alcoholic beverage
industry.49 While just a small sliver of the overall budget, the
government raises approximately $5.6 billion per year through
excise taxes on sales of alcohol.50
B. State Regulation and the Three-Tier Rationale
Once within the power of the states, the direction of
liquor regulation became subject to the “moralistic assumptions”
of the new liquor authorities and their local constituencies.51
Each state liquor authority could independently develop its own
rules controlling “how the trade should operate, with hours of
sale, location with respect to schools and churches, advertising,
the character of retail outlets, the degree of visibility of the
interior from the street,” and so on.52 More socially conservative
states adopted monopoly regimes by which the government
maintained full control over retail, or distribution and retail.53
The majority of states, however, developed a three-tier system
to license private dealers.54
To illustrate, in 1933, Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania,
a monopoly-control state, purportedly stated that the newly
minted Liquor Control Board would “discourage the purchase of
alcoholic beverages by making it as inconvenient and expensive
as possible.”55 Although the state has recently loosened its grip,

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466.
The TTB Story, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, https://
www.ttb.gov/about/history.shtml [https://perma.cc/JAD8-PYUN].
49 Id.
50 How Much is the Government Making off of Alcohol? TURBOTAX BLOG, (July
5, 2010), https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/taxes-101/how-much-is-the-government-maki
ng-off-of-alcohol-3418/ [https://perma.cc/6RL7-TZ4S].
51 MCGIRR, supra note 5, at 248–49.
52 Id at 248.
53 Murphy, supra note 44, at 824.
54 See id.
55 GRAY, supra note 5, at 10.
47

48
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particularly on wine retail,56 the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board has been the only entity that may purchase wine and
spirits from producers, set prices for wine and spirits, and sell
wine and spirits through state-run stores.57 To contrast, in
California, where alcohol comprises an important portion of
state revenue, the regime is more loosely constrained and allows
importers to function on all three tiers of the system.58 This has
allowed the Californian wine industry alone to produce $57.6
billion in economic activity for the state.59
Although the specific regulations may differ from state to
state, most eventually adopted some version of a “three-tier[ed]”
distribution system.60 A hallmark of the system is prevention of
“vertical integration” by prohibiting or limiting single ownership
of any of the three alcohol industry tiers—product
manufacturing, wholesale-distribution, and product retail—
depending on the state’s variations on the general principle.61
The state may exercise more control or less control depending on
local priorities.62 Post-Prohibition regulators and private citizens
alike were primarily interested in both discouraging alcohol
abuse and rebuilding the economy in the wake of the Great
Depression. A three-tier distribution system accomplishes this
by creating operation costs, thereby producing state revenue by
taxing at each level.63 It also prevents alcohol prices from sinking

56 Pennsylvania Wine Law Primer, WINESCHOOL, https://www.vinology.com/
new-wine-laws-plcb/ [https://perma.cc/AM7U-WUKN].
57 See 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3–301 (West 1997); see also Emma
Snyder, Note, Privatization in Pennsylvania: How Reforming the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code Would Benefit the Commonwealth and its Citizens, 119 PENN STATE L. REV. 279,
285–86 (2014) (citing 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2–207).
58 GRAY, supra note 5, at 12.
59 WINE INST., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CALIFORNIAN WINE AND
WINEGRAPE INDUSTRY (2015), http://www.wineinstitute.org/files/Wine_Institute_2015_
Economic_Impact_Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WHV-MMGE].
60 Elias, supra note 9, at 216.
61 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005); FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/
winereport2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCD2-G2R6]; Elias, supra note 9, at 210.
62 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 11.
63 Three-tier distribution creates not only state income, but also income for the
private dealers who participate in the industry. Elias, supra note 9, at 221–22. Economic
data shows that the scheme benefits the industry overall through its use of wholesalers
as intermediaries. Id. While wholesalers benefit from being able to sell a large quantity
of merchandise in a “relatively small number of transactions,” retailers also benefit
because they do not need to maintain such an expansive inventory as is available on the
market and can tailor their purchasing behavior to their customers’ needs as they
change. Id. Estimates predict that “‘wholesaler activities reduce retailers’ costs by almost
$52.00 for every $1,000.00 in retailer sales, for a national savings in retailer operating
costs of $7.2 billion per year.” Id. (quoting DAVIS S. SIBLEY & PADMANABHAN SRINGARESH,
DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF THE THREE-TIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 15 (2008), http://
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too low, a phenomenon that commentators have historically
correlated with increased rates of alcohol abuse.64
Proponents of the three-tier system argue that it remains
a viable modern-day framework for a number of reasons. Alcohol
is still considered more dangerous than “ordinary commodit[ies]”
and many believe that it should be subject to heavier regulation.65
Additionally, the three-tier system’s local flexibility empowers
communities to “tailor [their] rules to local conditions” via the
state regulatory authority, and it is inherently enforceable thanks
to a built-in proximity to law enforcement and accountability to
the community.66 The use of wholesalers67 also “makes it possible
to funnel the wide variety of available products to different
market niches with [an] efficiency that would not be available in
a marketplace without wholesalers.”68 This reduces transaction
costs, and ultimately, costs to consumers.69 Finally, limited
vertical integration and price minimums can, contrary to
popular belief, promote competition.70
There are plenty of opponents to the three-tier system,
particularly since the advent of the Internet, as the Internet has
been nothing if not a disrupter of traditional ways of doing
business. Some of the opponents’ complaints include that
producers, particularly small wineries, are often barred from
market entry because they outnumber wholesalers licensed to
distribute within the state; that the three-tier system limits
consumer choice; and that the three-tier system precludes
retailers from maximizing profits in many cases by barring
direct shipment.71

www.five-star-wine-and-spirits.com/includes/archivos/about_five_start/pdf/three_tier_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EW3-68XU]).
64 RORABAUGH, supra note 16, at 89–90.
65 Elias, supra note 9, at 218–19 (quoting THOMAS BABOR ET AL., ALCOHOL: NO
ORDINARY COMMODITY (2003)).
66 Id.
67 As a general term, “wine and spirits wholesalers . . . purchase goods on their own
account for resale.” Id. at 212. States may assign different rights to wholesalers, and for example
in New York, wholesalers are defined as “those licensees manufacturing, storing and
distributing alcoholic beverages for sale to licensed retailers.” Licensing Information, N.Y. ST.
LIQUOR AUTH., https://www.sla.ny.gov/licensing-information-0 [https://perma.cc/7XNG-W9RS].
68 Elias, supra note 9, at 220–22.
69 See id. at 220.
70 Id. at 224 (“When a supplier has an exclusive agreement with a distributor,
and when that agreement includes prescriptions about a minimum price for a product,
such arrangements can reduce intrabrand competition and stimulate the distributor’s
marketing efforts. This is because, in a territory where a distributor has exclusive rights
in a particular brand, that distributor does not compete with any other provider of that
brand in its territory, but it does have an incentive to invest in its brand in order to
compete vigorously against distributors of competing brands.”).
71 Murphy, supra note 44, at 825.
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II. NEW YORK STATE FRAMEWORK
New York is one of the majority states that adopted a
three-tier licensing system, as opposed to a monopoly system
post-Prohibition. The New York Legislature created the New
York State Liquor Authority to regulate the alcohol industry
within the state.72
A. New York State Liquor Authority
In 1934, New York State created the NYSLA as its
overarching regulatory body.73 The New York Legislature’s
intent in creating the NYSLA was to:
regulate and control the manufacture, sale and distribution within the
state of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of fostering and promoting
temperance in their consumption and respect for and obedience to law;
for the primary purpose of promoting the health, welfare and safety of
the people of the state, . . . and, to the extent possible, supporting
economic growth, job development, and the state’s alcoholic beverage
production industries and its tourism and recreation industry; and
which promotes the conservation and enhancement of state
agricultural lands; provided that such activities do not conflict with
the primary regulatory objectives of this chapter.74

Interestingly, the NYSLA still publicly espouses as its priorities
promotion of temperance, health, welfare, and safety within the
state. Economic growth is a secondary concern that may be
pursued only if not at the expense of the former.75 The NYSLA’s
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC) implements the
mission of the NYSLA primarily by determining eligibility for,
and issuance of, “licenses and permits for the manufacture,
wholesale distribution and retail sale of all alcoholic beverages.”76
The DABC is also responsible for inspecting licensee premises,
investigating violations, ensuring compliance with the ABC Law,
and conducting disciplinary proceedings that can result in
revocation of a license if required.77
In the event that any party is unsure of, or wants to
dispute, the application of an NYSLA rule, the NYSLA also
“issues administrative decisions, known as declaratory rulings,
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2014).
Historical Overview, N.Y. ST. LIQUOR AUTH., https://www.sla.ny.gov/
historical-overview [https://perma.cc/7J9Q-65MZ].
74 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 2.
75 See id. (Making a distinction between a primary purpose and other goals of
the NYSLA “to the extent [they are] possible.”).
76 Historical Overview, supra note 73.
77 Id.
72

73
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on the proper application of state wine laws. The rulings can
bind any person, property, or set of facts in New York.”78 NYSLA
adjudication is available to anyone who requires “a ruling on the
application of certain facts to an ABC law or SLA rule.”79 The
NYSLA consists of three commissioners, one of whom serves as
chairman, who are appointed by the governor, with the “advice
and consent of the senate.”80 These commissioners are responsible
for issuing declaratory rulings interpreting ABC Law,81 and it is
through these declaratory rulings that the NYSLA has shaped its
policies on the operation of TPPs.82
B. Three-Tier Framework in New York State
The government aims to keep the space between barley,
apple, or grape to glass three steps removed through its liquor
laws, which divide the industry into three tiers: production,
wholesale, and retail.83 Alcohol is governed by “overlapping state
and federal regulations,” which “limit vertical integration
between tiers” by prohibiting an entity from occupying more than
one tier.84 In New York, this means that (1) producers may not
have an economic interest in wholesale or retail operations, (2)
wholesalers may not have an economic interest in production or
retail operations, and (3) retailers may not have an economic
interest in production or wholesale operations.85 Occupants of
each tier must apply for and obtain different permits or licenses.86
The production tier consists of both importers, who bring
“distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages” into the United States
for sale to licensed wholesalers, as well as producers, or makers
“in the business of distilling distilled spirits, producing wine,
rectifying or blending distilled spirits or wine, or bottling, or
warehousing and bottling, distilled spirits.”87 In short, the
production tier generally consists of importers, distilleries,
Joyce, supra note 2, at 2046 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 2049 (footnote omitted).
80 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 10, 11 (McKinney 2014).
81 See id. (Defining the state liquor authority as its chairman and two
commissioners.); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 98.1 (2017) “Any person
may apply to the Authority for a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability . . . of
any rule of statute enforceable by the Authority.” Id. at § 98.1. “Petitions for a declaratory
ruling shall . . . [b]e addressed to Counsel, State Liquor Authority.” Id. at § 98.2.
“Declaratory rulings will be issued only in the discretion of the members of the Authority.”
Id. at § 98.3. “Declaratory rulings shall be binding on the Authority . . . .” Id. at § 98.5.
82 See discussion infra Section III.B.
83 See discussion supra Section I.B.
84 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 27 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
78

79
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wineries, breweries, cideries, and other such establishments. To
become an importer or a producer in the United States, an
individual or entity must apply for “a basic permit from [the
federal government via] the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau.”88 “After obtaining the permit, the [importer or] producer
may sell its products to any wholesaler that is located in the state
and has obtained a state license to distribute alcohol.”89
The wholesale or distribution tier is generally in the
business of acquiring or “manufacturing, storing and distributing
alcoholic beverages for sale to licensed retailers.” 90 In addition to
conforming with the requirements for obtaining the wholesaler’s
license itself, the wholesale tier is subject to further statutory
restrictions on how sales are to be recorded, and how the liquors
or beverages themselves are to be transported and delivered.91
The wholesaler of alcoholic beverages may not engage in any
other business on its premises, except for the sale of certain items
enumerated in the statute.92 These exceptions include the sale of
snacks, soft drinks, candy, tobacco products, picnic supplies, and
even “non-refrigerated salsa.”93 If the wholesaler is acquiring
goods for sale, it must do so from a licensed producer (or
importer), located in the same state.94 The wholesaler itself must
always maintain a location within the state.95
The retail tier consists of vendors, or retailers, who must
acquire a license to “purchase, stock and sell alcoholic beverages
for consumption on or off-premises.”96 Like occupants of the
other tiers, retailers must maintain a location within the state
in order to deliver directly to consumers within the state,97 and
may only purchase products to sell to consumers from licensed
wholesalers.98 Retailers are also further subject to compliance
with “a set of highly detailed regulations governing the location,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61, at 5–6.
Murphy, supra note 44, at 824.
90 Licensing Information, supra note 67; see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW
§ 104 (McKinney 2014).
91 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 104.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Murphy, supra note 44 at 824.
95 Id. at 824–25.
96 Licensing Information, supra note 67; see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW
§ 104-a (McKinney 2014).
97 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Out-ofstate retailers without an in-state operation cannot obtain a New York retail offpremises license.”). “Because New York’s three-tier system treats in-state and out-ofstate liquor the same, and does not discriminate against out-of-state products or
producers, . . . New York’s ABC Law[s] . . . do not run afoul of the Commerce Clause.” Id.
at 191–92.
98 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61, at 5.
88

89
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physical characteristics, and operating hours of their premises,
as well as their financial relationships with producers and
wholesalers, and the manner in which they keep books and
records for all their transactions.”99 States benefit from retail
sales through the applicable sales tax that retailers are required
to collect and transfer to the state government.100
III. TREATMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY-PROVIDER PROBLEM
The last decade has seen a proliferation of startup
companies aimed at delivering convenience, primarily to urban
young professionals, in the form of task management,101
housekeeping,102 grocery shopping,103 meal delivery,104 and alcohol
delivery.105 The availability of these services has rapidly changed
consumer behavior of that demographic. Indeed, TPPs “arguably
engage in activities for which a license is mandated,”106 and
despite changing consumers’ behaviors, state regulators of the
alcoholic beverage industry have been slow to react. To date, the
NYSLA has not mandated that TPPs apply for their own retail
licenses.107 The NYSLA has indirectly promulgated some
guidelines as to the legality of TPPs’ business practices by
evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, the applications of new TPPstyle companies seeking the NYSLA’s approval. Without
meaningful application of that guidance and further action,
however, this is insufficient to mitigate tensions between TTPs
and traditional industry players, to prevent illegal activity on
the part of TTPs and their partners, and to create an
environment conducive to economic growth within the industry
and for the state overall.
Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 188 (citing N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 105).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61, at 5; Murphy, supra note 44, at 825.
101 See, e.g., About Us, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/about [https://
perma.cc/KA6M-6S69] (“Our same-day service platform instantly connects you with
skilled Taskers to do your chores so you can be more productive, every day.”).
102 See, e.g., About Handy, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/about [https://
perma.cc/3VGM-ULPQ] (“Handy is the leading platform for connecting individuals
looking for household services with top-quality, pre-screened independent service
professionals.”).
103 See, e.g., About Us, FRESHDIRECT, https://www.freshdirect.com/browse.jsp?
id=about_overview [https://perma.cc/6X3N-UPTV] (“We’re on a mission to deliver quality
beyond question and convenience that adds something great to your day.”).
104 See, e.g., About Seamless, SEAMLESS, https://www.seamless.com/about
[https://perma.cc/B3AG-FUKF] (“Seamless is simply the easiest way to order food for
delivery or takeout.”).
105 See, e.g., About Us, DRIZLY, supra note 1 (“Transforming the way alcohol is
shopped, sold and shared. . . . We demand convenience in all facets of life—shopping for
clothes, groceries, furniture. Why should shopping for alcohol be any different?”).
106 Joyce, supra note 2, at 2037.
107 Id.
99

100
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A. Appearance of Third-Party Providers
Technology has changed consumer behavior in ways that
we may not have imagined even a decade ago, when meal
delivery still required browsing neighborhood take-out menus
collected and kept in a kitchen drawer, as well as an actual
telephone call to a restaurant. Today, online food delivery giant
Seamless attracts users with promises of zero interaction with
people and secrecy with regards to the average city dweller’s late
night dumpling and doughnut ordering habit.108 Similar to the
transformation of food delivery, the shift in the alcohol industry
began around 2008, when a web site called Wakozi started
offering alcohol delivery services from Manhattan bodegas and
wine and liquor stores.109 The company listed neighborhood
retailers’ inventory on the Wakozi website and received online
orders from customers. It then provided the retailers with order
information so that the retailers themselves could fulfill the
orders and make the deliveries.110 Wakozi has since shut down,
but a number of new companies operating on the same
premise—TPPs—have risen in its stead.111
B. NYSLA Adjudication & Declaratory Judgments
The NYSLA’s history of adjudication has created a hazy
regulatory landscape for new companies that wish to operate in
partnership with licensees.112 While there is no affirmative duty
on the part of new businesses dealing with licensees to seek
adjudication, it is an available mechanism for ascertaining the
NYSLA’s opinion on the legality of a specific operation and
avoiding an enforcement action.113 Even so, only a few TTPs have
108 About Seamless, supra note 104 (“Seamless is simply the easiest way to order
food for delivery or takeout. Whatever you’re in the mood for, wherever you’re in the
mood for it, you’ve got it. No menus, no phone calls, no repeating yourself.”).
109 Erick Schonfeld, Wakozi is Kozmo for Booze, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2008), https://
techcrunch.com/2008/03/28/wakozi-is-kozmo-for-booze/ [https://perma.cc/DR3C-CNWC].
110 Id.
111 See Lauren Sheffield, The Best Alcohol Delivery Services in NYC, HARPER’S
BAZAAR (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/travel-dining/a13852/
alcohol-delivery-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/87N2-J3K8] (These companies, such as Drizly,
Minibar, Swill and Thirstie, aim to act as intermediaries between retailers and
consumers, and they are what have become known as third-party providers.). For the
purposes of this discussion, “TPPs are independent persons or businesses that operate
websites to market and advertise [alcoholic beverages] for sale from licensed producers
and retailers.” Joyce, supra note 2, at 2037.
112 See discussion infra Section III.B.
113 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 98.1 (2017). According to the Rules
of the State Liquor Authority, “[a]ny person may apply to the Authority for a declaratory
ruling with respect to the applicability to any person, property or state of facts of [the
Alcohol Beverage Control Law or] any rule or statute enforceable by the Authority.” Id.
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sought adjudication, and, accordingly, the NYSLA adjudicators
have used those opportunities to articulate the NYSLA’s position
on what constitutes legal TTP activity.114 The adjudicators have
repeatedly referenced those declaratory rulings in subsequent
rulings as guidelines on its position regarding what constitutes
an acceptable relationship between licensee and non-licensee.115
The NYSLA adjudicators, however, also proceed to apply those
standards broadly and inconsistently,116 perhaps suggesting that
the NYSLA hopes to keep the regulatory landscape in the fog
until politics have had time to shift distinctly, and it can avoid
rocking the proverbial boat.
TPP applications for declaratory rulings began to appear
before the NYSLA after Groupon and Living Social—both
companies that sell coupons on their websites for one price, which
consumers can redeem for a higher amount—started offering
deals that included discounts on alcoholic beverages.117 The
NYSLA generally approved of the Groupon operation because the
company was careful to draw a hard line between the rights and
responsibilities of the licensee and the limited, extrinsic role of
Groupon.118 It then applied its analysis of Groupon to Living
Declaratory rulings represent the “discretion of the members of the Authority” and are
“binding on the Authority and shall not be retroactively changed,” as to that particular
set of facts. Id. §§ 98.3, 98.5 (2017).
114 See Application of Six88 Solutions, Inc. d/b/a ShipCompliant for a Determination
on Legality of Internet Advertising Platform, Declaratory Ruling 2013-01006A, at 7 (N.Y.
Liquor Auth. Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter ShipCompliant Ruling] (listing three kinds of
impermissible TPP-licensee relationships), https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/2013-0100
6A_-_Internet_Advertising_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU36-4X2K]; see also Operation of
smartphone/web application Drizly, Declaratory Ruling 2013-02526, at 2 (N.Y. Liquor Auth.
Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Drizly Ruling], https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/201302526_-_Operation_of_smarphone-web_application_Drizly.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULD67V5L] (applying ShipCompliant Ruling through two-part inquiry).
115 See, e.g., Operation of Smart Phone application “Century Club,” Declaratory
Ruling 2015-00074 (N.Y. Liquor Auth. Jan. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Century Club Ruling],
https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/2015-00074_-_Operation_of_Smart_Phone_applicati
on_-_Century_Club.PDF [https://perma.cc/6562-2BWZ] (referencing Drizly, Lot 18, and
Slingr Rulings and applying Drizly’s two-part inquiry); Operation of Smart Phone
application Slingr, Declaratory Ruling 2013-02826B, at 2–3 (N.Y. Liquor Auth. Oct. 22,
2013) [hereinafter Slingr Ruling], https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/2013-2826B_-_
Operation_of_Smart_Phone_Application_Slingr.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z62C-QES4] (applying
two-part inquiry set out in Drizly Ruling); Drizly Ruling, supra note 114 (condensing and
applying the ShipCompliant Ruling via a two-part inquiry).
116 See, e.g., Century Club Ruling, supra note 115; Slinger Ruling, supra note
115. See Operation of Mobile Phone Application Swill, Declaratory Ruling 2015-01557D,
at 1 (N.Y. Liquor Auth. July 14, 2015), [hereinafter Swill Ruling], available at https://
www.sla.ny.gov/files/2015-01557D_-_Operatin_of_Mobile_Phone_Application_Swill.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9AM-SUTV].
117 Know the Law: Adjustments at the NYSLA: Social Media, Enforcement, NYS
Brewers Among the Changes Affected, BEVERAGE MEDIA GROUP (May 2, 2012), https://
www.beveragemedia.com/2012/05/02/adjustments-at-the-sla-social-media-enforcementnys-brewers-among-the-changes-affected/ [https://perma.cc/MY9R-NVXN].
118 Id.
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Social’s more flexible proposal.119 Stressing the sensitivity of
potential “economic interest[s] in the licensed establishment”120
and that the “ABCL § 111 prohibits a licensee from making its
license available to a person who has not been approved by the
Authority to hold that license,”121 the NYSLA laid out its inaugural
guidance on TPPs. Most notably, the ruling emphasized the
importance of licensee control, placed a 10 percent of annual
revenue cap on the amount a licensee may pay a TPP, and forbade
the use of a percentage-based commission structure between
licensees and TPPs.122
In its next major relevant declaratory ruling, the NYSLA
found that a TPP–licensee relationship violated ABCL § 111
where the arrangement allowed an advertiser to engage in
conduct constituting the sale of alcoholic beverages by an unlicensed
entity.123 ShipCompliant is a company that worked with an
advertiser to provide licensees, such as wine stores and wineries,
with a mechanism to sell their products online through unlicensed
Internet advertising platforms, such as “internet marketing portals,
online magazines and specialty websites.”124 ShipCompliant also
purported that its model included built-in “regulatory compliance
services,” although it is unclear exactly how.125
The declaratory ruling in this case represents the
conclusion of what had been an ongoing investigation, presumably
due to a complaint from a community organization worried about
the oversaturation of certain areas with liquor licenses and
perceived unfair competition.126 The investigation uncovered a
number of material facts that had not been accurately represented
to the NYSLA.127 Although ShipCompliant’s application for review
noted that its product was designed to fit within the contours of the
three-tier system, the Authority was ultimately swayed by the fact
that the licensee in reality had very little control over sales in its
relationship with the advertiser.128 For example, the retailer
Id.
Application of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law with respect to on-line
coupon service by Living Social, Declaratory Ruling 2011-03527C at 2 (N.Y. Liquor Auth.
Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Living Social Ruling], https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/
2011-03527C-On-line%20coupon-LivingSocial.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5C-2C3H].
121 Id.
122 Id. at 3–4.
123 ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 5–6.
124 Id. at 2.
125 Id. at 2.
126 Sara Mann, New Marketing Model for New York—Lot 18 and the NYSLA,
HINMAN & CARMICHAEL LLP (May 1, 2014), http://www.beveragelaw.com/booze-rules/newmarketing-model-for-new-york-lot-18-and-the-nysla [https://perma.cc/XYL2-E9YC].
127 ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 1, 3.
128 See id. at 6.
119
120
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made a pre-determined profit, the advertiser made decisions
regarding which products would be sold and at what prices, and
instead of selling wines out of the retailer’s store, the wine was
actually being sold from a warehouse with which only the
advertiser had a relationship.129
Framing ShipCompliant as an extreme case, the
Authority went beyond the usual case-by-case analysis of
declaratory rulings to establish several rules. 130 In light of the
facts of ShipCompliant, the NYSLA designated three types of
impermissible TPP-licensee relationships: (1) a licensee may not
take a passive role and must incur some degree of business risk
through the relationship; (2) an unlicensed party may not
engage in retail functions that should be controlled by the store;
and (3) the third party’s profit may not be “a substantial portion
of the sale or sales made.”131 The NYSLA continues to point to
the ShipCompliant ruling, calling it “good guidance,” instead of
issuing definitive rules.132 Although the NYSLA clearly applied
these rules in the immediately subsequent Drizly ruling, further
distilling them into a two-part inquiry, the NYSLA’s application
in following rulings is increasingly vague.133
In applying the ShipCompliant methodology to Drizly,
the NYSLA applied a two-part inquiry derived from the
ShipCompliant ruling to identify Drizly as a model example of
TPP regulatory compliance. 134 Drizly is “a smartphone/web app
Id. at 3.
See id. at 7.
131 ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 7.
132 Mann, supra note 126.
133 But see Application of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law to Forbes Wine
Club by Lot 18, Declaratory Ruling 2014-01059 (N.Y. Liquor Auth. May 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Forbes Ruling], https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/2014-01059-Applica
tion_of_the_Alchoholic_Beverage_Control_Law_to_Forbes_Wine_Club_by_Lot18.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/AW8T-5Y6Y]. Not all rulings have been inconsistent. See id. In
adjudicating the application of Lot 18, the NYSLA appropriately found that an
advertiser can properly function in partnership with a licensee when there is no
question as to licensee control over inventory, fulfillment, payment and visibility. Id.
Lot 18 is a brick-and-mortar package store with its own website that partnered with
Forbes to market a wine club concept. Id. The Lot 18 judgment is consistent with prior
guidance because, like Drizly, Lot 18 controlled all aspects of the retail sale of the wine
on offer by selecting wines for the club and itself acquiring all inventory from New
York State licensed wholesalers, by reviewing orders, and by receiving payments. Id.
Although Lot 18 engaged another third party, We Ship, to fulfill the wine club orders,
Lot 18 handled all communications and directions to the shipper. Id. Forbes’ role was
limited to providing use of its trademark for a flat fee, and marketing, for which it
receives a flat fee per customer enrolled. Furthermore, the NYSLA determined that
the use of Forbes’ trademark did not constitute “deceptive or misleading advertising”
because there was no question as to which entity operated the wine club. Id. Lot 18
was openly visible on the website, and the name of the product itself is “Forbes Wine
Club by Lot 18.” Id.
134 See Drizly Ruling, supra note 114, at 2–3.
129
130
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that enables customers to purchase alcoholic beverages,” from
licensed retailers, for delivery.135 By structuring its operations
such that the retailer retains complete control over “products,
service and finances,” Drizly managed to insulate itself and
secured formal NYSLA approval.136 The model set forth strictly
follows the lessons of ShipCompliant: the licensed retailer
selects products from its own inventory to sell via its app, selects
the prices for these products, maintains its own credit card
processing account, receives funds for the purchases directly,
remits a flat fee to the third party, physically delivers the orders
and, in doing so, confirms that the purchaser is of legal age.137
The NYSLA split the analysis into two inquiries—first,
“whether the licensee is playing a passive role and if an
unlicensed person is acting in their place,” and second, whether
“an unlicensed party ha[s] an ownership or financial interest in
the licensed premises.”138 The passive role question takes into
account the business risk incurred by the licensee, functional
roles of the parties, and control over retail functions, including
“products, services, and finances.”139 The ownership interest
questions take into account control of funds and method of
compensation.140 Following this methodology, the NYSLA found
Drizly to be an archetype for how TPPs may legally operate in
conjunction with licensees.141
The NYSLA also pointed out that although the app
advertises certain brands, “the ads do not mention or list specific
retailers,”142 which may indicate some forethought on the part of
Drizly to combat the community block’s concerns about
competition. Notably, the NYSLA here mentioned that “there is
no argument” on either the availment issue or the ownership
issue,143 based on these facts describing a retailer that maintains
full control of its operation and pays a flat fee for strictly
marketing services by Drizly.144 The flat fee precludes any
inference of a financial interest in the licensee because it is not

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
137 Id. at 1–2.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Id. at 3.
140 Id. at 3.
141 See id.
142 Id. at 2.
143 Id. at 3; see discussion infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. If Drizly does not “control[] any
portion of the licensed business” then the questions of potential availment or joint venture are
moot. Drizly Ruling, supra note 114, at 3; see discussion infra Sections IV.A–B.
144 Drizly Ruling, supra note 114 at 3.
135
136
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linked to sales or profits, but the specific and unique service
rendered by the third party.145
The facts presented for declaratory rulings regarding
TPPs after Drizly all fall somewhere on the sliding scale between
the two extremes of ShipCompliant and Drizly. Despite the
restrictions illustrated in ShipCompliant, the NYSLA has
managed to declare valid every new TPP application since by
making implied exceptions for varying degrees and kinds of
infringement upon the original ShipCompliant rules.
In the adjudication of Slingr, the NYSLA found that the
licensee retained sufficient control despite the TPP’s significant
control over collection of funds and its maintaining a physical
presence on licensees’ premises.146 This is in direct conflict with
prior rulings’ emphasis on licensee control.147 Slingr was a
smartphone application that allowed friends to send each other
deliveries, or “slings” of both alcoholic beverages and food from
menus at licensed “on-premises” venue partners.148 When an
order was placed, the licensee was required to “accept or reject
[the] order,” and employees of the licensee then delivered the
orders and ensured that the recipient was of “legal drinking
age.”149 Slingr handled credit card processing, and each week
made a payment to the venue partners consisting of the total
amount for all purchases made at the venue through the app,
minus a twenty-five cent fee for each order and 2.5 percent per
transaction, which it paid to itself.150
In order for the system to function, Slingr installed its
electronic hardware at the venues with which it partnered.151
Although it did not charge for installation, the venue was
responsible for electricity and Internet to support the system’s
functioning.152 The NYSLA necessarily adopted a broad
interpretation of ShipCompliant’s rules to validate the Slingr
model.153 Even though Slingr took a percentage-based profit,
Id.
Slinger Ruling, supra note 115, at 2–3.
147 See, e.g., ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 6 (Finding a TPPlicensee relationship violated the ABC Law where “[the] method of operation allows an
unlicensed advertiser to exercise a high degree of control over the business operations of
the participating licensed seller.”); see also Drizly Ruling supra note 114, at 3 (finding a
TPP-licensee relationship legal where “[a] retailer participating with [the TPP] retains
total control of their products, services and finances.”).
148 Slingr Ruling, supra note 115, at 1.
149 Id. at 1–2.
150 Id. at 2.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Compare ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 5–6 (“find[ing] that
licensees may rely on” NYSLA Office of Counsel’s opinion that “the third party’s
compensation must be limited to a flat fee that is not contingent on the number of sales
145
146
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had established a physical presence at the premises of its
partner venues, and controlled collection and dispersion of the
funds generated by the arrangement, NYSLA still found that the
licensee retained “all essential controls” and that the third party
did not obtain an ownership interest because the fee was
insignificant.154 Although the fee may have been insignificant for
the licensee, 100 percent of Slingr’s profits were apparently
produced by these transactions.155
In its adjudication of Century Club (the Club), the
NYSLA found, without examining the licensee’s control over
pricing, that the smartphone application for a discount
membership club did not violate ABC Law.156 Century Club could
be considered a hybrid of Groupon or Living Social and Slingr.
The company “intends to have members who pay a monthly fixed
membership fee so that they may receive discounts of up to 50%
on food and beverages at participating venues.”157 The company’s
web site advertises access to “50% off drinks, all day, every
day.”158 Century Club members order via smart phone and
redeem their discounted orders by showing a confirmation code
to employees of the licensed on-premises venue.159 Members can
either pay directly for their purchase or with a credit card that
the member has placed on file with Century Club.160 When
members pay with credit card through the app, the price of the
purchase and a preset tip are deposited in an account accessible
only to the licensee.161 When members pay the Club directly, the
Club collects the same price and tip, but remits it to the licensee
within one week.162 The Club’s sole income is derived from
membership fees, and it does not take any transaction fees or
percentage of sales from the licensee.163 Because “[t]he Club does
or the amount sold,” and finding that a TPP-licensee relationship invalid where “[the]
method of operation allows an unlicensed advertiser to exercise a high degree of control
over the business operations of the participating licensed seller”), with Slingr Ruling,
supra note 115, at 3 (finding the TPP-licensee relationship valid where the TPP took a
percentage-based profit, had established a physical presence at the premises of its
partner venues, and controlled collection and dispersion of the funds generated by the
arrangement).
154 Slingr Ruling, supra note 115, at 3.
155 See id. at 1–2 (describing Slingr’s business model). Proving an unviable
model, Slingr shut down in May 2016. @Slingr, Twitter (Apr. 28, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://
twitter.com/Slingr/status/725829490086125569 [https://perma.cc/F3SB-ADA7].
156 Century Club Ruling, supra note 115.
157 Id. at 1.
158 Home, CENTURY CLUB, http://www.centuryclubapp.com/#Home [https://
perma.cc/PLP6-RVTY].
159 Century Club Ruling, supra note 115 at 1.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1–2.
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not receive any portion of customer funds for alcoholic
beverages . . . [it] is not engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages
and there is no violation of ABCL § 111.”164 Even so, the NYSLA
failed to address the possibility that this model appeared to give
subscribers access to alcoholic beverages at special prices not
necessarily determined by the licensee. This oversight is in direct
conflict with the ShipCompliant ruling, which specifically
emphasized the importance of licensee control over pricing.165
In its adjudication of Swill, the NYSLA found the model
compliant with the ABC Law without scrutinizing the fee
structure for potential availment issues.166 Swill operates much
like Drizly, in that it is a smartphone application “that enables
off-premises licensees to offer their products for sale on the
app.”167 But where Drizly charges the licensee a flat fee solely for
its marketing services,168 Swill charges its $100.00 per month
licensing fee, as well as “[$5.00] for every ‘item’ sold via the
app.”169 For every bottle of wine or six pack of beer, the wine and
spirits retailer or beer retailer each pay Swill $5.00 per item in
transaction fees.170 Retailers accept or reject the order, fulfill
delivery and ensure sales are only made to those of legal
drinking age.171 Like Drizly,172 Swill will also advertise liquor
brands, but the ads direct consumers to manufacturers’
websites, not the website of the participating retailer.173 Based
on the facts presented, NYSLA determined that
Swill
does
not
control
traditional
retail
functions[,]
and . . . licensees . . . retain control of their operations and
sales. . . . The rate of $5.00 may be high proportionally to the price of
the product actually sold but the consistent flat rate ensures that
Swill’s compensation is not a portion of the licensed premises’ sales
but rather a per transaction fee.174

In so ruling, the NYSLA elevated form over substance.
The NYSLA has disfavored a percentage-based fee because there
is a good case for availment under § 111 of the ABC Law where
a third party’s compensation composes a portion of the licensee’s
Id. at 2.
ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 7.
166 See Swill Ruling, supra note 116, at 1.
167 Id. at 1; see also Drizly Ruling, supra note 114, at 2.
168 Drizly Ruling, supra note 114, at 3.
169 Swill Ruling, supra note 116, at 1.
170 Id. The $100.00 licensing fee only accrues, however, if “the app generates at
least $3,000 in sales for the retailer per month.” Id.
171 Id.
172 Drizly Ruling, supra note 114, at 2.
173 Swill Ruling, supra note 116, at 1.
174 Id. at 2.
164
165

272

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

sales, and therefore a significant interest in the licensee’s
business.175 A per transaction fee that can actually amount to a
significant percentage of any particular sale and encourage the
same interest-driven behavior that a percentage-based fee
entails. If a liquor store sells a bottle of vodka for twenty dollars
and Swill receives a five dollar fee from that transaction, it still
amounts to a 25 percent cut of the transaction. Under a per
transaction fee regime, the TTP will simply be more interested
in sales volume than the quality of each individual order.
Further, percentage-based fees concern regulators because they
imply that a TPP is benefitting to a certain extent from use of
the license, or that a percentage of sales generated by owning
the license are remitted to a non-licensee.176 The TPP thus
acquires a sense of proprietary interest in increasing the sales of
the licensee for its own benefit. Similarly, a per-transaction fee
simply replaces percentage of sales with number of sales, in that
a greater number of sales generated through ownership of a
license will mean greater profits for the non-licensee.
Contrary to its stated intention of issuing a comprehensive
advisory regarding TPPs,177 the NYSLA continues to warn new
companies of the rules set out in ShipCompliant, yet refuses to
enforce them in earnest. In doing so, the NYSLA continues to
create an unlimited number of exceptions with each new request
for declaratory judgment, now becoming fewer and fewer as the
NYSLA espouses an “anything goes” attitude toward TPP
relationships with licensees. In fact, Amazon, one of the TPPs
active on the NYSLA’s own e-Commerce Task Force, began
operating in New York without obtaining a declaratory judgment
regarding its TPP model.178
Meanwhile, in developing their own responses to TPPs,
other jurisdictions such as the District of Columbia and Texas
have looked to the NYSLA for guidance of their own.179 In doing
so, they have interpreted the Drizly model as the proper
illustration of a company following the restrictions laid out in
ShipCompliant to create a practicable model.180 The NYSLA is
therefore not only creating a hazy regulatory landscape, but also
175 See ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 5 (“[F]ind[ing] that licensees
may rely on” NYSLA Office of Counsel’s opinion that “the third party’s compensation
must be limited to a flat fee that is not contingent on the number of sales or the amount
sold”); see id. at 7 (A TPP-licensee operation is impermissible “where the compensation
to a third party is a substantial portion of the sale or sales made.”).
176 See E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 6:56–7:36.
177 See ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 7.
178 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 2:19–3:06.
179 See discussion infra Section V.C.
180 See discussion infra Section V.C.
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potentially undermining its own authority within the industry
itself. If the entity responsible for liquor control prefers to
reference its past rulings as proper guidance instead of taking
more concrete action while it waits for the political dust to settle
on an approach to TPPs, it should apply those rulings
thoughtfully and uniformly.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NYSLA’S APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Many TPPs have likely not requested NYSLA evaluation
of their business models due to its lenient treatment of others on
the past few years, but it is also likely that those companies are
availing themselves of their partners’ licenses to sell alcohol.
Notably, the NYSLA has publicly acknowledged that it is more
concerned about regulating off-premises retailer relationships
because actors in such relationships are more prone to engage in
potentially illegal conduct where there is no check on
transparency and the identity of the licensed retailer is very
possibly unknown to the consumer.181 Likewise, it is probable
that the control mechanisms that the three-tier system
mandates must stay with the licensee are more regularly
infringed upon in these kinds of arrangements.182 The NYSLA’s
leniency toward availment may also have led to third-party
arrangements that are truly joint ventures, meaning that TPPs
should be responsible for owing their partners fiduciary duties.
Finally, the way that some TPP business models operate may
create unfair competition problems that shake the foundation of
the three-tier system.183 Although its critics argue against its
utility in the modern world and decry its intrinsic anticompetitive nature,184 the three-tier system does arguably
function for the purposes it was set up for, and the Supreme
Court has affirmed its constitutional validity.185 Thus, it is
imperative for the NYSLA to assert its jurisdiction over TTPs
and regulate them in a meaningful way.
A. Availment
The New York ABC Law specifically states that a license
“shall be available only to the person therein specified, and only
E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 4:07–5:13.
See id.
183 See id. at 17:45–19:40.
184 See Murphy, supra note 44, at 825.
185 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005) (“States can mandate a
three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of their authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
181

182
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for the premises licensed and no other except if authorized by
the authority.”186 In order to determine the existence of improper
use of license by a non-licensee, or availment, the NYSLA
applies a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the licensee maintains
sufficient, active control over its retail business; and (2) whether,
by virtue of the relationship, a TPP has acquired an ownership
or pecuniary interest in the licensee’s business.187 For TPPs, this
should mean that their licensed partners must incur some
degree of business risk through the relationship, that TPPs
themselves may not engage in retail functions that should be
controlled by the licensee, and that the TPP’s profit through the
relationship may not be “a substantial portion of the sale or sales
made.”188 The result of the NYSLA’s loose application of this
standard, however, undermines the state’s ability to effectively
regulate by license.
The policy behind the law limiting the use of a license
solely to the licensee is twofold. First, and most obvious, the
state has an interest in preventing “undesirable persons,
ineligible to secure a license, from operating a liquor business
through another licensee as a ‘blind.’”189 Otherwise, the
legitimacy of the license itself would be compromised. Second,
and at the same time, the community has an interest in
preventing “an unsuitable person, whose business would have
an adverse effect on community residents, from operating a
liquor business through another licensee whose impact on the
community was acceptable.”190 Certainly, many neighborhood
brick-and-mortar retailers with their own reasons for either
declining to work with a third party or not having the
opportunity to work with a third party, would argue that these
relationships are not acceptable to their community.191
While one way to look at these infringements is
availment, another way to view them is as joint ventures.
Because authorities are in conflict as to the elements
constructing the precise legal relationship, a joint venture can
be difficult to identify.192 In general, it is understood to be a
partnership entered into by two or more persons for a particular
project, “as opposed to a general partnership for all business
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 111 (McKinney 2014).
See discussion infra Section III.B.
188 ShipCompliant Ruling, supra note 114, at 6–7.
189 Cleveland Place Neighborhood Ass’n v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 268 A.D.2d
6, 11 (2000) (quoting Matter of Potter v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 37 A.D.2d 760 (1971)).
190 Id.
191 See E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 14:33–21:18.
192 Joint Venture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (quoting HENRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 106 (3d ed. 1983)).
186

187
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purposes.”193 The consensus is that there must be a showing of
“(1) an express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose that
the group intends to carry out; (3) shared profits and losses; and
(4) each member’s equal voice in controlling the project.”194 This
kind of partnership would clearly be impermissible between a
licensee and a non-licensee,195 unless the business venture did
not make use of the license. A failure to regulate effectively
creates a vacuum where these types of arrangements could be
operating under the radar.
Although availment is the more immediate issue, the
argument that these arrangements could be joint ventures may
be harmful to TPPs in the event of future litigation. Arguments
brought against startups in other heavily regulated industries
may be instructive in predicting the outcome of such litigation.
By providing a platform for hosts to list, and for guests to access,
a market of short-term rentals online, for example, Airbnb
functions within the rental real estate industry much like a TPP
does in the alcohol industry.196 Because the Airbnb-host
relationship could be construed as a kind of legal partnership,197
“[i]n New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the Service Economy v.
AirBnb, plaintiffs and former Airbnb hosts argued that the
relationship between hosts and Airbnb constituted a joint
venture,” triggering a “reciprocal duty of loyalty—which
would . . . prevent Airbnb from making the decision to release
private, sensitive host information without the host’s consent.”198
The issue was never fully litigated,199 so it is unclear how such
an argument may fare in the future, but the joint venture
characterization is one that may hold water for purposes of
litigation over TPP-licensee relationships.

193 Johanna Interian, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy
Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 143 (2016).
194 Joint Venture, supra note 192.
195 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 111 (McKinney 2014) (“[The license] shall
be available only to the person therein specified, and only for the premises licensed and
no other except if authorized by the authority.”).
196 See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://
perma.cc/8DS4-Z4V4].
197 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 5, New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the Sharing Economy v. Airbnb, Inc.,
No. 158526/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 1, 2014) (characterizing the Airbnb-host
relationship as a joint venture, a form of legal partnership).
198 Interian, supra note 193, at 143.
199 See Decision and Order on Motion, New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the
Sharing Economy v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 158526/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 7, 2015).
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B. Unfair Competition Problem
New York courts generally recognize two kinds of unfair
competition doctrine.200 “Palming off” is “the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer as those of another,” even where the parties are not
in direct competition.201 A second theory, misappropriation,
“concerns the taking and use of the plaintiff’s property to compete
against the plaintiffs own use of the same property.”202 Two of the
most prominent TTPs, Amazon and Drizly, further illustrate some
of retailers’ major concerns about potential unfair competition.
Because TPPs do not usually inform the customer where
the product is coming from, they may arguably be “palming off”
the goods of the licensee as their own. Amazon, for example,
works with licensed retailers, lists their inventory, and takes
orders for alcohol that are then fulfilled by a licensed retailer.203
When consumers make a purchase from Amazon, they believe
that they are buying from Amazon, even though the law requires
that they buy from the licensee.204 Retailers argue that these
customers cannot be the store’s customers if the buyer doesn’t
even know where the product is coming from.205 These perceptions
are reinforced when TPPs handle the customer service. If an item
is out of stock, for example, it is often an employee of the TPPs
who contacts the customer to suggest a replacement.206
Additionally, all of the traditional brick-and-mortar
retailers have had to acquire a license in order to conduct
business in New York, and thus, many believe that allowing
TPPs to operate without having to obtain a license themselves
permits TPPs to misappropriate licenses, creating unfair
competition.207 Many of these long-standing community retailers
are convinced that TPPs are truly availing themselves of their
retail partners’ licenses, thereby enabling them to act as “virtual
liquor stores” and escaping regulation to the detriment of
licensed retailers.208 Because TPPs face very low barriers to
entry without a licensing requirement, retailers argue that it is
unfair that third parties are allowed to function as virtual liquor
stores that can make an automatic profit through licensing
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 858–59 (N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 858.
202 Id. at 859 (quoting Roy Export v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1105
(2d Cir. 1982)).
203 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 18:09–20:34.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 18:33–19:40.
207 Id. at 20:35–21:18.
208 Id. at 18:09–21:18.
200

201
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software, transaction fees, and liquor brand advertising.209
Retailers argue that TPPs are effectively soliciting and
participating in the sale of alcohol, while exposing themselves to
very minimal risk, when they profit from the sale of these products
and services to licensees.210 This is particularly true if the state
allows politics to prevent it from enforcing its prior decisions.
Furthermore, some retailers may not have the
opportunity to work with a TPP, even if they would like to. Some
retailers argue that this creates an unfair playing field because
the model would allow TTPs to work with one retailer in each
neighborhood or delivery zone, to the exclusion of every other
retailer in the area, even if more than one retailer is interested
in working with the TPP.211 Drizly is one such TPP that functions
on this premise.212 Drizly operates by working with local brick-andmortar retailers, and listing the inventory the stores have selected
to sell on Drizly on the web site and smartphone application.213
Consumers enter their address, and therefore, depending on their
location, different inventory will be available for purchase.214 Drizly
works with a limited number of stores in each area, so there is no
confusion over which store will fulfill the order.215 For retailers, this
means that if Drizly has enough partners in any given
neighborhood to meet its fulfillment needs, some retailers may not
have the opportunity to work with Drizly.216 TPPs are thereby
exploiting the unclear regulatory landscape to frustrate the
purpose of the New York’s three-tier system.
V. INTEGRATING TPPS WITH A THIRD-PARTY-PROVIDER PERMIT
There are three possible solutions to the problems caused
by the uncertainty of the regulatory landscape, but a unique
permit for TPPs would best balance the needs and concerns of
the different interest groups involved. Any solution must
balance the interests of the state and its regulators, the
Id. at 18:09–21:18.
Id.
211 Id. at 20:35–21:18.
212 See How Drizly Works, DRIZLY, https://drizly.com/how-it-works [https://
perma.cc/CY2U-6X9G]. Drizly has recently transitioned to a “marketplace” model, which
allows “consumers [to] simultaneously browse the inventories of multiple local retailers
and compare prices between them.” Drizly Launches Online Marketplace for Beer, Wine
& Spirits, Drizly (Sept. 29, 2016), https://drizly.com/drizly-launches-online-marketplacefor-beer-wine-spirits/e-97721ff250e942ac [https://perma.cc/2X68-4L7L]. It is unclear,
however, whether this model has affected the choice of licensees who would like to work
with Drizly.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 20:35–21:18.
216 Id. at 18:09–21:18.
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licensees, and TPPs. The state is primarily interested in
maintaining legitimacy by enforcing its laws and collecting
revenue, as well as protecting the health of its citizens by
making sure that alcohol prices do not fall too low. Licensees,
usually brick-and-mortar retail stores in this context, are
concerned with maintaining their places in their communities
and in maintaining a level playing field with their competitors.
TPPs, usually entrepreneurial startups, prefer to avoid regulation
and minimize costs. Operating in a regulatory vacuum can be
advantageous in the short term, but that behavior can also be
high risk in the long term.217 While ideas such as bright-line
legislation and a comprehensive advisory should also be
considered, this note argues that the solution that best addresses
the concerns of all of these interest groups is a third-party permit.
A. New York’s Attempt to Problem-Solve TPPs: The NYSLA
Task Force on E-Commerce
TPPs present industry complications that the NYSLA
deals with on a daily basis. The parties involved all seem to
agree that some form of guidance from the NYSLA is needed,
but they have yet to come to a consensus on a practicable
solution. In February 2016, Governor Andrew Cuomo tasked a
group of policymakers with determining the best way forward.218
Specifically, this task force was charged with proposing “a clear
framework for regulating sales of alcoholic beverages through
third party providers.”219 The group held two meetings where
task force members and other interested parties and community
members were invited to present and discuss issues surrounding
TPPs.220 The task force opened its first meeting with comments
acknowledging TPPs as opportunities for market expansion that
are “here to stay,”221 but its second, and final, meeting opened
with greater reservation, noting that the “three-tier system has
fundamental principles that cannot and should not change
217 It can either be dangerous for companies, or force them to err unnecessarily
on the side of caution, stifling innovation, when a regulatory body hangs the threat of
impending regulation over the industry but for years fails to act on it.
218 Press Release: Governor Cuomo Announces Alcoholic Beverage Control ECommerce Task Force, NY.GOV (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-announces-alcoholic-beverage-control-e-commerce-task-force [https://perma.cc/QVK2H75R]; see also E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 1:53–2:02.
219 Press Release: Governor Cuomo Announces Alcoholic Beverage Control ECommerce Task Force, supra note 218.
220 See generally E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22; E-Commerce Task
Force Meeting, N.Y. ST. LIQUOR AUTH. (Feb. 29, 2016), http://abc-state-ny.granicus.com/Media
Player.php?view_id=2&clip_id=970 [https://perma.cc/EGU8-KCJJ].
221 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 0:24–1:02.
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simply because of advances in technology.”222 Ultimately, the
only consensus reached was that there was no consensus,
particularly between TPPs themselves and the brick-and-mortar
stores that either choose not to work with a TPP, or have not had
the opportunity to do so.223
B. Amendments to ABC Law
For many years, legislatures resisted amending the ABC
Law in response to TPPs, and will likely continue to resist
because amending the law would result in an impractical
result—imposing a generic law on a vast variety of business
models that work with licensees.224 In 2013, however, the New
York State Senate proposed a bill that would have amended
ABC Law § 111 to allow vendor licensees operating at large sport
and entertainment venues to share their profits with the owner
or operator of those venues, provided the venue is located on
“real property owned by the state of New York or a political
subdivision thereof.”225 The bill would have given owners and
operators of stadiums the ability to profit from the sale of alcohol
without themselves holding a license.226 The bill never made it
past the investigations committee,227 but had it become law, such
expansive access to use of a license may have influenced
regulators and opened a flood gate that would be difficult to
close. Although an attractive benefit of bright-line legislation is
that it eliminates uncertainties, it is at the same time an
inflexible option. In a rapidly evolving industry, where the cost
of experimentation is not very dangerous, there is little
justification for adopting such an inflexible solution. More
important is finding a solution that balances competing interests
and benefits the industry and the community overall.
C. Comprehensive Advisory
Another way to deal with the present regulatory
ambiguity would be for the NYSLA to issue a comprehensive
advisory. An NYSLA Advisory (Advisory) is a document that
provides guidance to parties with the purpose of assisting them
Id. at 1:43–1:53.
Id. at 12:44–13:01.
224 Id. at 3:38–4:07.
225 S. Investigations and Gov’t Operations Comm., S5320, 2013–14 Reg Sess. (N.Y.
2013), http://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2013/S5320 [https://perma.cc/QD22-ELAY].
226 Id.
227 Id.
222

223
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in complying with state liquor law.228 The NYSLA has most
recently issued advisories on issues such as brand label
registration, improper marketing of wine, and wholesale summer
shutdown periods.229 California, Texas, and Washington, D.C., are
the only other jurisdictions that have issued general advisories on
TPPs engaging in partnerships with licensees, in general.230
Together, the collective regulatory attempts of these three
jurisdictions, along with New York, and their corresponding
considerations, have established two main camps with respect to
where to draw the fine line between retailer and third party; states
either allow TPPs to collect payment to be remitted to the licensee
or they require the licensee to collect payment directly. Although
there are a number of factors at play, the bulk of regulators’
attention has been focused on how parties handle money.
California, being the largest wine producer in the United
States,231 as well as the home of Silicon Valley and a still growing
technology sector,232 issued an advisory on TPP relationships
with licensees in 2011.233 This California Advisory defined TPPs
as “unlicensed entities that are involved with the promotion,
marketing, and facilitation of sales of alcoholic beverages by
licensees over the internet.”234 Although only licensees can
engage in the transaction of sales, the California Advisory does
not expressly prohibit TPPs from taking part in the exchange of
money.235 Third parties may collect payments, if and only if, they
228 See Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining advisory
opinion as “[a] nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a
matter submitted for that purpose.”); see generally Bulletins, Divisional Orders and
Advisories, N.Y. ST. LIQUOR AUTH., https://www.sla.ny.gov/bulletins-divisional-ordersand-advisories [https://perma.cc/G5CC-L53Y].
229 See 2016 Wholesaler Summer Shutdown Periods, Advisory 2016-5 (Apr. 26,
2016), https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/Advisory_2016-5_-_2016_Wholesaler_Summer_
Shutdown_Periods.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z3X-Q735]; Brand Label Registration, Advisory
2016-3 (Apr. 12, 2016) https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/Advisory_2016-3_-_Brand_
Label_Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGV2-N5N5]; Improper Marketing of Wines,
Advisory 2016-4 (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/Advisory_2016-4_-_
Improper_Marketing_of_Wines.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPG3-4BTZ].
230 Sara Mann, DC Weighs in Strongly on Third Party Marketer Delivery
Services, HINMAN & CARMICHAEL LLP (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.beveragelaw.com/
booze-rules/2014/9/9/dc-weighs-in-strongly-on-third-party-marketer-delivery-services
[https://perma.cc/4SZ7-C82T].
231 See Number of wineries in the United States in 2017, by state, STATISTA (2017),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259365/number-of-wineries-in-the-us-by-state/ [https://
perma.cc/FZ85-JL9A].
232 Andrew L. Wang, The 10 best cities for tech jobs, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-10-best-cities-for-tech-jobs-2017-10-26 [https://
perma.cc/2SG3-TZVK].
233 CAL. DEP’T OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, INDUSTRY ADVISORY: THIRD
PARTY PROVIDERS (2011), https://www.abc.ca.gov/trade/IA%20Third%20Party%20Provid
ers.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6BP-65MM].
234 Id.
235 Id.
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remit the entire amount collected directly to the licensed
retailer, effectively granting the licensed retailer full control
over disbursement.236 The third party cannot subtract its cut and
send the rest to the licensee; instead the licensee must receive
the full amount owed for the products sold and then make a
payment to the third party for its services.237 In Texas, the law
requires a person to obtain a permit in order to “solicit or take
orders for liquor.”238 The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission
has weighed in on the TPP problem by adopting California’s
guidelines in their entirety.239 It also restricts third parties from
engaging in direct shipping and from storing alcohol in its own
distribution centers.240
In contrast, the Alcoholic Beverage Regulation
Administration (ABRA) in Washington, D.C., has adopted a
more conservative view. In D.C., the retail license applicant
must be “the true and actual owner of the establishment for
which the license is sought, and he or she [must] intend[] to carry
on the business for himself or herself and not as the agent of any
other . . . .”241 The sale of alcohol, including the solicitation of
orders for sale, is prohibited to persons not license holders.242 In
2013, the ABRA issued its first opinion with respect to TPPs when
BeerRightNow.com requested industry guidance.243 That ruling
most notably concluded that a third party would be engaging in the
illegal solicitation of sales by participating in the exchange of
money between the consumer and the retailer.244 Therefore, a TPP
in D.C. may function legally only when the licensed retailer collects
the funds or payment information directly from the customer.245
In crafting its more recent advisory, the ABRA
interpreted strictly the prohibiting language that an online TPP
should not obtain “a substantial interest in the exchange of

Id.
Id.
238 TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, MARKETING PRACTICES ADVISORY—
MPA056: WINE SHIPPING AND THIRD PARTY ADVERTISERS/ PAYMENT PROCESSING SERVICES
(2013), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/marketing_practices/advisories/MPA056.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5YRA-HD5D].
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 D.C. CODE § 25-301(a)(5) (2015).
242 D.C. CODE § 25-102(a) (2015).
243 BeerRightNow.com, LLC, t/a BeerRightNow.com, Advisory Opinion No. 2013062, 1 (D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter BeerRightNow
Ruling], https://abra.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/abra/publication/attachments/BeerR
ightNow.com%20-%20March%2020%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMT3-TH2A].
244 Id. at ¶ 5.
245 Id. at ¶ 6.
236
237
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money between the consumer and the retailer,”246 nor should it
“accept or receive money, debit or credit card information, or
other financial instruments on behalf of a retailer.”247 In doing
so, D.C. relies not only on its original judgment in
BeerRightNow, but also on that of New York’s Drizly ruling,
presumably read in tandem with the ShipCompliant ruling.248
Further, the D.C. opinion borrows the strictest elements of other
states’ advisories, resulting in what is arguably the narrowest
permissive regulatory scheme in the country. The ABRA found
that
Title 25 of the D.C. Official Code permits online third party providers
to connect customers through the internet to a licensed off-premise
retailer, as long as the transaction to purchase alcoholic beverages
occurs between the consumer and the licensed retailer . . . . [F]unds
for each sale [must go] directly from the customer to the licensed offpremise retailer.249

The ABRA also explicitly prohibits a number of activities,
including collecting money from the customer, charging
customers’ credit cards, storing alcoholic beverages for sale, and
fulfilling, shipping or delivering the orders.250
Although D.C. followed New York’s lead in blocking third
parties from collecting money from customers at all, the irony is
that New York’s relatively clear framework, set out by
ShipCompliant, illustrated by Drizly, and adopted by the D.C.
ABRA, has crumbled in subsequent rulings.251 Perhaps this
deconstruction can be attributed to the push and pull between
the governor’s interest in growing the tech industry in New York
and the strong traditionalist community lobby. Likewise, in
2009 California, which now espouses the more liberal approach,
issued a much stricter advisory that was later turned on its
head.252 The industry interpreted the earlier advisory to mean
that the ABC considered any TPP “soliciting orders of alcoholic
beverages for or on behalf of licensees is engaged in the ‘sale’ of
alcoholic beverages and must hold a license issued by the
246 Online Third Party Advertisers, Advisory Opinion No. 2014-314, 4 (D.C.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. Aug. 13, 2014) (quoting BeerRightNow Ruling, supra note
243, at ¶ 5), https://abra.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/abra/publication/attachments/On
line_Providers_Ad_Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/85CM-8E33].
247 Id. (quoting BeerRightNow Ruling, supra note 243, at ¶ 6).
248 Id. at 3–4.
249 Id. at 4.
250 Id.
251 See discussion supra Section III.B.
252 See CAL. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, INDUSTRY ADVISORY: UNLICENSED
THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2009), https://www.abc.ca.gov/trade/Advisory-Third%
20Party.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KP6-ECFM].
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agency.” 253 To clarify, the 2011 advisory explained that this
language did not mean that third parties were outlawed, or that
they had to acquire a license that did not exist.254 Rather, third
parties could continue to function as long they adhered to certain
restrictions, particularly reserving retail functions for the
licensee, including distribution of funds.255 It may be that this
revision can be attributed to the influence of the booming West
Coast tech industry.
New York and California have much in common,
including that they have two of the biggest markets for alcohol
sales in the country and also want to encourage growth in the
technology sector. Even if the NYSLA takes a California-style
approach, however, little is likely to change for TPPs in New
York. An advisory does not provide the state with a mechanism
for enforcement and the NYSLA would have to use its existing
resources to investigate and ensure compliance. With so many
political forces and interest groups involved, it is unlikely that
such an advisory would have much impact beyond clarifying the
NYSLA’s position on TPPs. To contrast, regulators in D.C. cut
their teeth on new TPPs by issuing cease and desist orders until
they issued their comprehensive advisory.256 Those companies
then amended their business practices to comply with the
regulations as explained in the advisory.257 While this is an
option available to the NYSLA, it is perhaps an impracticable
one due to the large size of the industry and more favorable
attitudes toward entrepreneurs. Furthermore, an advisory
typically would not provide a mechanism for regulators to collect
information on TPPs as a matter of course, and retail licensees
would not likely find that this solution adequately addresses
their own concerns.
D. Separate Third-Party Permit
At its final e-Commerce Task Force Meeting, the NYSLA
noted that among other possible solutions, it plans to consider a
253 Paul Franson, California Warns Internet Wine Sellers: Recent advisory says
‘third parties’ need a liquor license, WINES & VINES (June 23, 2009), https://
www.winesandvines.com/template.cfm?section=news&content=65546 [https://perma.cc/
F2RQ-5RH3].
254 See CAL. DEP’T OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, supra note 233.
255 Id.
256 See Ultra, Order Lifting Cease and Desist No. 2014-317 (D.C. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd. Aug. 15, 2014), https://abra.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/abra/
publication/attachments/Ultra%20-%20Order%20to%20Cease%20and%20Desist%20%206%2025%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCQ5-3WYR].
257 See id.
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separate permit for TPPs, and that it is in the process of reaching
out to other states regarding how they are dealing with the
third-party issue.258 Considering how regulatory bodies within
other rapidly evolving and highly regulated industries have
implemented permits in response to the rise of entities that do
not fit within the traditional mold may also be instructive.
Businesses that deal in virtual currencies, until recently,
have been unregulated and operating on the fringes of the
financial system. They remain unregulated in many parts of the
country, but the New York State Department of Financial
Services (NYSDFS) brought them within the state’s regulatory
regime by issuing a new law requiring these businesses to acquire
and comply with the terms of a new, specific license.259 There is
some debate over the appropriate terminology, but in New York,
a virtual currency is “any type of digital unit that is used as a
medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.”260 The
state treats a virtual currency as a unit that has obtained some
sort of value not denominated in legal tender.261 Virtual currencies
therefore do not “touch [US] banks” or fall within the purview of
the Federal Reserve.262 Although virtual currencies may take
various forms, the most prominent example is a cryptocurrency
known as “Bitcoin,” a kind of virtual currency that is produced by
algorithm,263 “at a mathematically-controlled rate, and with a
supply subject only to free market demand.”264
Although the currency itself is not regulated, NYSDFS
has determined that businesses that engage in certain “Virtual
Currency Business Activit[ies]”265 fall within its supervisory

See E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 11:59–12:29.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.3 (2017).
260 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p) (2017).
261 See DONG HE, ET AL., IMF, TAXONOMY OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES,
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 8 (2016), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9BM-YMG6].
262 Pete Rizzo, Federal Reserve Chair: US Central Bank Can’t Regulate Bitcoin,
COINDESK (Feb. 27, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/federal-reserve-chair-uscentral-bank-cant-regulate-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/5E79-J24D] (alteration in original).
263 See Frequently Asked Questions: Who created bitcoin?, BITCOIN.ORG, https://
bitcoin.org/en/faq#how-are-bitcoins-created [https://perma.cc/9VN4-3WDJ].
264 Andrew Wagner, Digital vs. Virtual Currencies, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Aug.
22, 2014, 3:25 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/digital-vs-virtual-currencies1408735507 [https://perma.cc/M3SX-FT66].
265 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q) (2017). The business
activities related to virtual currency now regulated by the NYSDFS are:
258

259

(1) receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or Transmitting Virtual
Currency, except where the transaction is undertaken for non-financial purposes
and does not involve the transfer of more than a nominal amount of Virtual
Currency;
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purview and thus has promulgated the “BitLicense,”266 after the
eponymous cryptocurrency. Proper acquisition of the BitLicense
brings virtual currency dealers into compliance with the
financial regulatory scheme in New York State. The application
process requires payment of a $5,000 application fee267 and
preparation of a lengthy dossier, including reports prepared by an
independent investigatory agency and documents detailing the
company’s management structure, policies and procedures,
“banking arrangements,” and “proposed, current, and historical”268
business plans.269 Awardees of licenses must then comply with a
strict set of regulations, including maintenance of a compliance
officer and related policies, certain capital requirements, programs
for protection of customer assets, cybersecurity and anti-money
laundering, as well as a record-keeping history that is stricter
than under federal law.270
It is an expensive process, but proponents of the license
argue that the companies that acquire it will likely build greater
“consumer trust,” and thus espouse industry investment and the
trust of banks,271 making it a worthwhile long-term investment.
At the same time, the high cost of the application itself and
subsequent compliance costs make the license feasible for only
certain companies that have the ability to direct significant
sums to compliance. One consequence of the licensing
requirement was that many budding virtual currency companies

(2) storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual Currency on
behalf of others;
(3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
(4) performing Exchange Services as a customer business; or
(5) controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.
Id.

266 See BitLicense Regulatory Framework, N. Y. ST. DEP’T OF FIN. SERV.,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework.htm [https://perm
a.cc/SLV8-XRD5].
267 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.5 (2017).
268 Id. § 200.4.
269 See generally id. §§ 200.7–200.19 (2017).
270 Evan Weinberger, BitLicense Fine Print Could Make Compliance Difficult,
LAW360 (June 3, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/663347/bitlicense-fine-printcould-make-compliance-difficult [https://perma.cc/XME2-BN66] (“BitLicense holders
will be subject to record-keeping requirements on transactions for seven years under the
final regulation. While that is a drop from the [ten] years the [Department of Financial
Services] originally proposed, it is still two years longer than required under the Bank
Secrecy Act, a 1970 federal law that has become a cornerstone of [anti-money laundering]
enforcement.”).
271 DAVIS POLK, NEW YORK’S FINAL “BITLICENSE” RULE: OVERVIEW AND
CHANGES FROM JULY 2014 PROPOSAL 3 (2015), https://www.davispolk.com/files/
2015-06-05_New_Yorks_Final_BitLicense_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4XQ-SVHD].
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were forced to leave New York altogether.272 Those opposed to
the license complain that this type of regime not only stifles
innovation, but also severely disadvantages these new
businesses by imposing tighter rules than those imposed on
traditional banking entities.273
Arguments for and against a TPP permit (or license)
within the alcohol industry are similar to those within the
financial sector—regulators and traditional industry players
view licenses favorably, whereas new companies deride the idea
as “burdensome” and “stifling of innovation.”274 In considering the
third-party permit concept, the NYSLA stated that, “[s]uch a
permit would enable retailers to engage TPPs with confidence and
compliance. A permit would identify TPPs actually operating and
permit the NYSLA to review operations, and their books and
records for compliance.”275 Further, members of the three
traditionally regulated tiers of the alcohol distribution system
agreed that “a permit would be a benefit to the industry,”276
presumably because regulated entities view it as a way to level
what has become an uneven playing field.
Ultimately, support for, and practicability of a thirdparty permit will depend on the details of such a permit, but if
the permit is kept proportional to the industry, it is unlikely that
the costs of such a requirement would burden nascent companies
the same way that the BitLicense costs could overwhelm a new
virtual currency company in New York. Where virtual currency
gives rise to the potential for a host of criminal activity for
financial regulators to be concerned about, from money
laundering to the sale of illicit drugs on the dark web, the
insertion of a sub-tier into the three-tier system will likely do
little to rock the boat, except perhaps respond to modern
consumer preferences and perhaps at some point change the way
we buy and sell alcohol.
CONCLUSION
If New York ultimately hopes to attract the innovators
that will secure its future as a state with a thriving tech
industry, it must find a way to accommodate ingenuity within
272 Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of Bitcoin Startups from New York,
FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-yorkbitlicense/ [https://perma.cc/UC3E-VAPL].
273 See id.
274 E-Commerce Task Force Meeting, supra note 22, at 10:36–11:28.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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traditional models, like the three-tier system. At the same time,
it must balance the interests of the brick-and-mortar retailers
who built their livelihoods by the old rules, and evolve with
changing consumer behaviors. An effective and enforceable
solution would be to impose the requirement of a third-party
permit upon those companies that aim to indirectly benefit from
the sale of alcohol by working with a licensee.
As long as the requirements to obtain such a permit are
not overly burdensome, this solution would create predictability
and stability for new companies and remove the unfair advantage
sensed by brick-and-mortar stores by adding barriers to entry for
TPPs, while allowing regulators to better understand and adapt
to changes in the industry. Regulation of TPPs need not be
avoided, and in fact, would ultimately benefit all parties involved.
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